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1. Introduction
The Hungarian society was among the first in Central and Eastern Europe which tried to cut off 
the political and ideological bounds of the soviet-type political and economic system. Soon after 
the failure of the 1956’s revolution, the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (Communist Party), 
launched the policy of gradual, reform style changes. Via the politics of the step-by-step comprom­
ises, the Hungarian society gradually developed in the direction of a mixed-economy. For instance, 
the growing importance of the second economy since the late 1950’s, the different waves of 
decentralization-centralization in the state and the cooperative sectors, and finally the introduc­
tion of the “inside contracting” within the state firm’s sector and the policy-package aimed to cre­
ate small business from the early 1980’s on, altogether, produced a combination of a mixed eco­
nomy and a political system of the so-called “soft-communism”1.' Due to the cumulative character of 
the economic and political changes, we could notice without surprise the flexibility and radical 
pragmatism of the last communist government, under the pressure of the forces of opposition and 
the changing pattern in the super power's relations. This government, officially, declared the re­
volutionary character of the 1956, initiated the negotiations about the departure of the soviet 
troops stationing in Hungary since the end of the World W ar E , demolished the “iron curtain” 
and within the extremely short period of time introduced a democratic constitution and accepted 
the multi-party system.
In the following chapters, I try to illustrate the main dimensions of the creation and the erosion 
of the centralized autocratic type corporative Industrial Relations System in the centrally plan­
ned command economy. During this attempt, I try to avoid the so-called “label-type” approach, 
such as “communist”-“post-communist” society. At this moment, it is difficult enough to know in 
advance the social-political outcome of the current changes in the ex-socialist countries. These 
societies are still in the phase of political and economic changes. However, whatever will be the
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course of events and the pathway followed, it is clear that the new systems of values, norms and 
patterns of individual and collective behaviour are emerging.
2. The centralized corporatism based on the system of political- 
ideological and economic monopoly
After the World W ar II -more exactly from 1949-a particular system of political-ideological and 
economic monopoly has been created in Hungary, under the auspices of the soviet political-ideolo­
gical influence and military presence. The economic monopoly hs based, first of all on the almost 
full nationalization of the industrial, trade and service sectors. To illustrate the degree of changes
in the country’s property structure, I would like to note that, before the W W II , only 10% of the
2 )industrial assets were state owned". The nation-wide nationalization was accompanied by the intro­
duction of branch-oriented economic policy and the introduction of the centralized (“socialist”) 
planning. (The key function of the socialist planning was to replace the market allocation of re­
sources by the bureaucratic-redistributive system of regulation.)
The economic monopoly based not only on the almost exclusive nationalized (state) ownership 
and the centralized planning, but also on the extremely concentrated organizational structure of 
the business firms. The following table illustrates the degree of centralization in the Hungarian
3)manufacturing sector .
The centralized planning and the nationalization process have touched not only the industrial 
and service sectors but also the agriculture. The first campaign of the collectivisation was car­
ried out during the first half of the 1950’s, the second one at the end of 1950's. As a result of 
these forced campaigns of collectivisation and the organizational concentration in this sector; the
Table  1 . The s ize  o f the  m anufacturing firm s
Hungary Capitalist 
(sample)
economies
Average No. of employees per firm 1 8  6* 8 0
Percentage distribution of employee by size categories (%) 
1 0 — 1 0  0 persons 1 4 3 5
1 0 1 -  5 0 0 2 6 3 3
5 0 1 - 1 0  0 0 1 9 1 3
over 1 0 0 0 * 4 1 1 9
*  In the U S S R  the average number of employees at the 47 ,000  industria l enterprises 
(investigated) surveyed is over 800 . (in) Kabalina, V. Komarovsky I The T ransform ation of 
Industria l Relations and Trade Union, Reform  in the U S S R  Conference on “Industria l 
Relations and Trade Unions in the Former Soc ia list Countries, Vienna, In s titu te  for 
Advanced S tudies. 14-17 October, 1991.
Source ! Kornai, J . (1989 ) ! The Hungarian Reform  Process, (in) Nee, V .-Stark , D. (1989 ) I 
Remaking the Economic Institu tions of Socialism  I China and Eastern  Europe S tanford 
S tan ford  University P ress , p .47.
Note I the figures re fer to average of various years in the 1 9 7 0 ’s. The cap italist economies 
sampled are A ustria , Belgium, France, Ita ly , Japan and Sweden.
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F ig . 1 The “ S ta l in is t ”  model o f I.R .S . in Hungary ( 1 9 5 0 -6 8 )4>
majority of agricultural cooperatives and state farms’s activities embraced more than one village. 
This also means, that the key political actor in the Hungarian villages was the cooperative presi­
dent and not the local community (government) leader, or party secretary.
The briefly described economic monopoly was completed by the political-ideological monopoly of 
the Communist Party. During 1950’s, the traditional partners of the Industrial Relations-govern- 
ment, employers, employees and their respective organizations - have the only obligation to ex­
ecute the decrees of the ruling Communist Party (in Hungary called; Hungarian Socialist Workers’ 
Party). In this quasi-orwellian world, the Communist Party and its leadership tried to develop and 
maintain an image of the omnipotent and ever reaching power. The following slogan desribes this 
approach: “The Party knows everything, is present everywhere and capable to do everything”. 
According to such kind of ideology system, conflicts of interests do not exist, therefore the auton­
omous social actors and institutions being concerned with the interest representations of em­
ployees and employers are unnecessary. This explains, among others, why the autonomous institu­
tion of Industrial Relations is missing in the ex-socialist countries.
At the macro (national) level, a centralized and autocratic version of corporatism has functioned; 
this means that the far reaching decisions on the social and economic future of the country have 
been made in the highest decison-making body (“Politburo”) of the Communist Party.
The Industrial Relations partners: government officials, union leaders and firm ’s managers had
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only the obligation to execute the party’s resolution, translated into plans and indicators. This 
centralized and autocratic model of Industrial Relations, is often called the “Stalinist” variant of 
the l.R.S. in the centrally planned command economiesj:i.
The next figure presents the main characteristics of this model, functioned in Hungary, till the 
end of the 1960’s.
In this system of Industrial Relations, the conflicting interests of different social-occupational 
groups were oppressed. But, in 1956 at national wide dimension and during the 1970’s in the 
various forms of illegal strike (“quota restriction") demonstrated the individual and collective 
forms of worker’s resistance .
3. The erosion of the centralized-autocratic corporatism
Industrial Relations System, according to the following broader definition, can be understood as 
the totality of actors, institutions and procedures being concerned with the wage determination 
and controlling working conditions (substantive rules) and with the structuring of the bargaining 
process (procedural rules). The cumulative character of the political and economic changes in the 
Hungarian society have had important effects on the actors, institutions and procedures of the In­
dustrial Relations Systems. The most important elements of these changes were, firstly, the de­
velopment of the second economy (economic activities organized outside the official economic in ­
stitutions) from the end of the 1960’s. Secondly, at the beginning of the 1980’s, the government laun­
ched a decentralization movement in the “first” economy. The growing economic importance of the 
second economy became visible from the mid-1970’s. At the end of this decade, one third of the 
household income was generated from the second economy. The role of this kind of economic acti­
vities were extremly important in the agriculture, housing construction and the service sectors7). 
The existence of the second economy generated not only extra income but enlarged the opportuni­
ties for individual and collective actions. So, an important segment of the employees could realize 
their interests and learned to manipulate the social relations out of the official Industrial Relations 
institutions. Finally, the growing acknowledgement of organizational conflicts land interests relatio­
ns has led to careful measures— on national and firm level— of coordination and representation 
of interests.
This means, that, within the official Industrial Relations System “core” workers gained and im­
portant bargaining power in relation to plant’s managers at the expense of the “peripherical” 
workers. The different socio-economic factors constituting employer’s environment and the va­
rious positions occupied by worker’s groups in the labour process and in the labour market are
8 )reflected in the constellation of their interests and power relations .
The first important step in the decentralization of the Hungarian economy— without organiza­
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tional decentralization— was the introduction of the “New Economic Mechanism” in 1968, which 
aimed at the regularization of the economy using economic tools instead of administrative ones.
The following four types of indirect (economic) regulators replaced the administrative tools of 
the Central Planning9':
1: Financial regulations 
2: Wage regulations 
3: Price regulations 
4: Foreign trade regulations
In spite of the relative success, these changes could not solve the wellknown efficiency problems 
in the former socialist countries. To increase the flexibility and adaptability of the economy and 
to stop the further deterioration of the living standard of the Hungarian population, after the mas­
sive borrowing the foreign loans, at the beginning of the 1980’s, the government launched the 
policy of further decentralization. For instance, in the big state-firms, employees had the right to 
negotiate with the company management about the ratio of their input and output.
This practice of the “inside contracting"— which functioned only after the official working 
time— was not supervised by the unions. Blue and white color workers participating in this kind 
of “inside contracting”, are autonomous not only in organizing and controlling their work, but in 
their negotiation with their superiors about the ratio of their effort and wage. More than 10% of 
the full-time industrial wage earners have got experiences in this kind of “high involvement work­
ing system”. The high level of participation in the second economy, and in such kind of organiza­
tional innovations as the “inside contracting” revealed that, “... in Hungary very different social 
groups have experiences not only to be adopted to an interventionist, bureaucratic state but to the 
market mechanisms as well, through their social relations which opened channels for actions on 
the basis of reciprocity10! ”
4. Company union as a transitional element of the emerging 
new Industrial Relations System?
The briefly described changes into the direction of a mixed economy, gradually eroded the cen­
tralized and autocratic corporatism in Hungary. W ithin the labour market context of the full em­
ployment, important socio-professional groups disposed a strong— very often informal-— 
bargaining positions in relation to the state owned company’s management. Manpower policy in 
the former socialist countries produced a constant manpower shortage, in which individual work­
ers have in important bargaining positon in the form of the “exit-option” within the organization.
From the late 1960’s till the late 1980’s-according the well known slogan of the labour 
movement— “the tight labour market was the best friend of the workers11' ” Furthermore, in many 
cases, workers formed coalition of interest with the state firm’s managers for the purpose to
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evade the central wage control. The unions, at the firm ’s level, supported in general the above 
mentioned coalitons. Gradually, the centralized corporatism transformed into the company (“in 
house”) unionism.
The results of an international survey, carried out in the middle of the 1980’s in the electric
and electronic industry, support also, the existence of the above mentioned social-pattern of the
12)“company unionism" in Hungary
The data collected in ten countries, show that there are no clear differences between the capital­
ist and the ex-socialist countries concerning the workers’ identity towards the firm. However, a 
significant difference can be noticed in relation of the Western European and other countries re­
garding the identity with the firm and the unions. For instance, the identity with the firm among 
the Western European workers (German, Italian, French, English, Swedish workers) means exclu­
sively an identity with the company’s management. While, in the case of the ex-socialist countries 
(Hungarian, Polish and Yugoslav firms participated in the survey)— as well as in Japan and Hong 
Kong, this identity includes the identity with the co-workers. Summing up the particular type of 
identity in the Hungarian firms investigated, we could say that it extends to the whole community 
of the firm; including not only the identity with the co-workers but also with the management. The 
identity with the whole community of the firm may be explained in the following way.
Worker's thinking and attitudes towards the different roles of the management and the unions 
are not deeply rooted in the class-based interest and organizational structure. This tendency was 
reinforced by the introduction of the Enterprise Council (E. C.) system in 1985. This body of 
“quasi-self management”, carried out the strategic decisions in the big and medium sized state 
firms. One half of the E. C. members was elected directly by the rank and file employees, the 
other half were members (ex officio) of the management or delegated by the company’s director. In 
practice, the E. C. became the new tool of the managerial control and accelerated the “deregula-
1S)tion” of the union— otherwise also weak— role in the long-term business decisions .
The increasing economic and the related social importance of the employees’ participation in the 
second economy, and in the activity of the “inside contracting” etc. within the state firms streng­
thened the amorphous and diffuse type social relations among the partners of the Industrial Rela­
tions System. Such constellation of the social relations in the economy, facilitates both the de­
velopment of the company’s level corporatism and the non-cooperative type union activities. Plus, 
the growing unterainty in the economic situation (uncalculable effect of the COMECON, fast in ­
creasing unemployment etc.) results move up and down of in the relative power of trade unions 
and employers.
In Hungary, the birth of the independent, autonomous union movement preceeded the 1990’s 
free election, and the collapse of the communist political system.
To great surprise of some new union leaders, these changes did not produce any clear cut
changes in the above mentioned identity pattern. Instead of the massive support of the new, inde­
pendent union, we had to assist a development of the well-known phenomenon of “social-anomie”. 
This means that the employees are refusing to cooperate with both new and old unions and with 
the management. The growing anomie among the rank and file employees contradicts to such 
kind of generally accepted view that the decline of union power would strengthen the management 
integrative power or vice versa.14^ In the next part, we try to examine some sources of this "social 
anomie” or legitimacy crisis of the emerging, new Industrial Relations System.
5. The road of the independent union movement is paved by chaos?
The 1980’s were the years of erosion of the monolithical communist political systems combined 
with command economy15^ . The Central and Eastern European societies are still in the period of 
rapid changes. It is difficult enough to know in advance the results of this process in the diffe­
rent ex-socialist countries. However, the 1990’s will be the years, in which social scientists will 
assist, study, evaluate and shape the emerging civil society.
The less visible and less dramatic, but long-term devastating social consequence of the “real- 
socialism” was the dissolution of the civil society and its replacement with the illusion of it.
On “civil society” we mean institutions, based on voluntary membersnips, organized to express 
the individual and collective aspirations and interests of their members. For instarce, among the 
constituent elements of the civil society, free trade unions, or in a more general sense, the auton­
omous Industrial Relations was missing. The democratically elected new Hungarian 
government— the free elections were held between the 25th March, and 8th April, 1990— has 
had to confront with numerous urgent economic and social problems, such as a huge foreign inde­
btedness of the country, industrial restructuring, high inflation rate, fast growing unemployment 
etc. Unfortunately, until present, the development of the autonomous system of Industrial Rela­
tions has got relatively few attention. Political forces in power or in opposition are dealing with 
this social institution according to the constellation of the power struggle among them. (The par­
liamentary decision concerning the trade union’s property— in July 1991— illustrates this phe­
nomenon.) Following the broader definition of the Industrial Relations System, negligible efforts 
were made to elaborate the “procedural rules” regulating the relations among the government, em­
ployers, employees and their respective organizations. For instance, the so-called Council for In­
terest Reconciliation— tripartite institution functioning in Hungary— has no obligatory agree­
ments, resolutions, which could create rules and obligatory norms for the participating partners. 
However, this institution of “Council for Interest Reconciliation fuctions at national, regional and 
firm level and in the long run could develop social rules for the cooperation among the social 
partners of Industrial Relations.
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The following indicators illustrate the amorphous relations prevailing in that field16"1:
1: On the side of the employers and government, rules are confused. For instance, in the 
state sector— which still is the largest employer of the country— it is not clear, what is 
the role of the state as an owner and as a neutral mediator during the conflicts between 
the employers and employees in the state firms.
2: The employers and their organizations are uncertain concerning the government intention 
to respect their mutually accepted agreements. Their problems of cooperation reflect the 
“minimum trust relations” between them. One main resource of the existing law trust rela­
tions between the government and company’s managers is the slowly changing and still 
unclear property relations.
3: The divided and paralyzed Hungarian trade union movement on the side of the employees 
interest representation, have also enormous difficulties in the creation and respect of the 
“substantive” and “procedural” rules of the new Industrial Relations System.
In the last part of this paper, we would like to concentrate only to the issue of the paralyzed and 
divided union movement and its possible social outcomes.
Shortly after the collapse of the centralized and autocratic corporative style I.R.S. in Hungary, the 
social scientists could assist a process of the decentralization and deconcentration of the union 
movements. For instance, officially there are 800 registered unions, but in reality they count in 
general about 150. The general trend observed is the declining union membership.
In spite, the above mentioned great number of unions, seven important union organizations are
17)the following :
% Number
1: Democratic Ligue of the Independent Unions: 3,3 130,000
2: National Alliance of the Workers’ Councils: 2,7 106,000
3: Solidarity Workers’ Alliance .......................................... : 1,8 75,000
4: Autonomous Unions ....................................................... 9,4 374,000
5: Block of the Intellectual U n ions.....................................  : 1,6 63,218
6: Cooperative Forum of the Unions .................................  : 14,0 557,295
7: National Alliance of the Hungarian Unions ................  : 67,2 2,682,753
(At present, we have to use these data carefully, more reliable statistics concerning the union 
membership will be available, after the union election, planned to be held within a year.)
The current crisis of the Hungarian trade union movement represents a multidimensional social 
and ideological phenomenon. Firstly, the political-legitimacy crisis is an “effet pervers” of the for­
ty years of centralized-autocratic corporatism. This political legitimacy crisis concerns mainly the 
largest employee’s organization, the National Alliance of the Hungarian Unions (MSZOSZ).
Secondly, the newly emerged “independent” unions of other type of employee’s interest organiza­
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tions (for instance “Solidarity Worker’s Alliance”) were unable to increase their membership in an 
important rate. Thirdly, the government do not want to continue a serious dialogue with these un­
ions. The approach of the government varies according to the type of unions.
In the case of the largest union alliance— more than two million members— the lack of political 
legitimacy is responsible for the government non-willingness for cooperation. The newly emerged 
independent unions have a low membership rate, therefore for the government they are not 
enough “heavy" to represent the employee’s interest, they have weak bargaining positions. The 
fourth, the Hungarian Parliament, recently— in this summer— has frozen all union property by 
the majority vote. The union property will be divided according to their “election performance” 
during the union election to be held within a year.
Finally, we have to mention another— in general underevaluated— component of the union cri­
sis: from the 80 ’s in the Hungarian economy we can see an important shift in the employment 
structure and the productions methods— or in a more general sense in the production paradigm. 
Among others, this means for instance the growing importance of the service sectors, the expan­
sion of the non-standard employment, decentralization of the manufacturing sector,fast growing
i o\
small firms . W ithout the analysis and the evaluation of these dimensions of the Hungarian union 
movement, it would be impossible to produce an appropriate diagnosis and policy for the creation 
of the new Industrial Relations System.
6. Some risks of the new Industrial Relations System in Hungary
Nowadays, we can observe an important shift from the hegemonic marxist ideology (partly based 
on the exclusivity of the state ownership) into the direction of the liberal-conservative kind one 
(based on the supremacy of the private ownership). In relation of that changes, we share the anxi­
ety expressed by an expert of the Hungarian economy: les changements politiques ont amene
au pouvoir de nouvelles majorites liberales ou conservatrices qui cherchent a se debarasser 
rapidement de toutes les institutions economiques mis en place par le pouvoir precedent, cet en- 
gouement pour le liberalisme n ’est pas sans presenter certains dangers: la croyance que la seule 
privatisation permettre a atteindre l’economie de marche et k travers elle, l’abondance, laisse peut 
de place a l'analyse du possible echec du marche dans plusieurs secteurs19!”
The one year experiences of the privatisation— following the political collapse of the socialist 
political system in 1990— are supporting the above mentioned ideological one-sidedness and its 
alarming social consequences on the emerging trade union movement. For example, according to 
the first account of the privatisations, the Hungarian unions are playing a diminishing role both at 
national and local (firm) level. The key institution of the privatisation process, the State Proprety 
Agency (SPA), like other government institutions, try to neglect the weak, divided and therefore
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low profile unions20).
Only some militant and well prepared unions can reach, in a large extent, the so-called “collec­
tive agreement" which includes some guarantee concerning the employment, wages and other work­
ing condition issues.
The need for innovative solutions in the field of the Hungarian Industrial Relations System,
• 21) could be satisfied by using the various national experiences within the European “laboratories"
The current process of the European integration creates both challenge and opportunity for the 
renewal of the Industrial Relations System in the ex-socialist countries. Implementing the new 
political and economic systems in these countries, we should learn from each other’s success and 
failure. Such kind of “collective learning” and the cooperation based on it, probably would play an 
important role in the mutual understanding and the co-creation of the new European social institu­
tions.
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